Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, thank you for

taking the lead, organizing today’s hearings, and I’m grateful for

the opportunity to be here to speak.

I’ll organize my remarks around a few brief points. I believe our

single goal—single dominant and defensible goal—still remains to

seek a political settlement to end Darfur’s internal war. We need

to achieve this through concerted international means. We need to

achieve a political settlement within Darfur that will replace

Darfur’s violent internal war with an interim cease-fire, a new

form of governance under fair and just terms, backed by reliable

and verifiable guarantees. And I believe there are no feasible alternatives.

We need a strategy that is grounded in realism and patience.

It is going to take 3 to 5 years to negotiate a way forward

in Darfur. There are no quick fixes, there are no quick military options.

Military options are a utopian diversion, in terms of grand

interventions that are going to suddenly change the situation. We

require a multilateral approach. We cannot act effectively without

allies. We need the Security Council Perm Rep members. We need

European allies, and we need African allies. And we need support

within the Arab League.

In the current context of the war on Iraq, our standing in the

world is severely compromised. To imagine that we’re going to mobilize

any array of support around anything other than a steady,

pragmatic, negotiated peace settlement is simply unrealistic.

I am in support of continuing to keep our eye on the prize. The

prize is a negotiated political settlement. Using various forms of

sanctions, targeted sanctions, on Khartoum, as many that—of

those sanctions that are, today, on the table, to service that goal

can make a lot of sense if it is tied strategically toward getting to

a settlement. Sanctions need to be put in force against Khartoum.

They need to be put in force against the spoiler nonsignatory combatants

in Darfur, who, as we’ve heard, are continuing to carry out

atrocities.

Diplomacy has to have primacy in this effort. We have no choice.

There are no close—there are no quick fixes to this. We need to

give primacy to our diplomatic efforts to renew a Darfur political

negotiation. We have an agreement, in the form of the Annan plan.

We have renewed leadership, in the form of Jan Eliasson and

Salim Salim. We have renewed leadership within the U.S. Government,

in the form of Andrew Natsios and John Negroponte. We

should be focusing that effort around what is realistic to achieve

in moving forward a negotiated political negotiation and settlement

for Darfur that builds off of the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.

Sustained high-level U.S. leadership has been, for several years,

a strategic element in achieving results in Sudan. The north-south

peace accord, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January

2005, only came about over a 3- to 5-year period through sustained

U.S. engagement. Senator John Danforth made crucial contributions.

Similarly, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, in his

role, made pivotal contributions in getting to the Darfur Peace

Agreement of last May. They’re hard lessons to the pattern of U.S.

engagement. It has not been continuous, it has not been sustained,

there have been breaks and lack of continuity, and we’ve—as we’ve

seen with the May Darfur Peace Agreement, which, because of a

lack of follow through, fell apart.

I want to mention, also, while we’re talking about the centrality

of U.S. political leadership at a high level, that what is happening

in Somalia does not help us. I know this hearing is not about Somalia,

but our partnering with the Ethiopians in a counterterrorism

campaign in Somalia, which is now beginning to turn

very ugly for us, is widely seen within the region as anti-Islamic.

It’s now—we’re now under allegations—perhaps true, perhaps

false—of associating ourselves with a policy of renditions and war

crimes. But we have provided the region—we’ve provided Khartoum,

inadvertently, with a new angle for arguing about the lack

of moral standing of the United States in putting a focus back on

Darfur. And it’s also widening the crisis within the Horn and focusing

a broad—focusing—requiring a focus on a broader level.

There are scattered and uncoordinated international efforts today

with respect to Darfur. I mentioned, earlier, the United Nations-

African Union effort, led by Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, offers

the single best hope for moving this—for moving forward in this regard,

for a renewed political process. It can be backed by sanctions,

or the threat of sanctions.

I want to touch, briefly, on the sensitive issue of genocide, because

that has been the dominant concern of this hearing. In the

United States, there seems to be a broad consensus that what is

happening in Darfur constitutes a continuous genocide. That view

is not necessarily shared among our key allies in Europe, in Africa,

in the Middle East. It is not necessarily shared by those who are

operational on the ground in Darfur. This is a problem. We have

not won the opinion argument, internationally, around this issue.

And it’s a problem. And it gets back to the point that unilateralism

will not work in Sudan. Multilateralism will work. Talking about

genocide may not be the lead argument in getting people to cooperate

in a joint effort. Talking about a negotiated peace settlement

maybe.

On the question of Chinese influence, I agree that there has been

a subtle shift in China’s approach to Sudan, a greater willingness

to raise the issue with senior Sudanese leaders, and that there is

an emerging consensus with the United States on implementing

the three-phrase Annan plan as the best way forward. I agree that

the Chinese are more public, and they are willing to dispatch, as

they just did with Zhai Jun, the assistant secretary, to dispatch

senior-level officials to Darfur, and to have them saying important

things publicly that reinforce our position.

I also believe that, if we move toward sanctions, we’re going to

have to be very careful in how we execute them. If, for example,

we begin to impose unilateral smart sanctions under plan B,

focused on select individuals and commercial entities, and these

measures do not directly target Chinese economic interests, it’s

conceivable that these pressures could be raised through sanctions,

while action in collaboration with China continues. However, if we,

somewhere, somehow, along the line, step into an active campaign

of vilifying China, threatening their strategic interests, or threatening,

as many are proposing now, a boycott of the 2008 Olympics,

we can pretty well rely on losing their cooperation in the Security

Council and their cooperation in Khartoum, and, as we’ve seen recently,

in Darfur. There are many specific things that can be tabled

further with the Chinese as measures that they can move forward

in this period.

Two last points:

Don’t forget how important the humanitarian channels are. Two

and a half million people, 13,000 humanitarian workers, billions invested.

This is a U.S.—predominantly a U.S. achievement of leadership.

This is a population that is highly vulnerable, both the humanitarian

workers and those in the camps, the civilians that are

imperiled and remain in the camps, and remain 100-percent dependent

upon international handouts. We cannot treat this reality

in a frivolous manner. We have to acknowledge that if we take a

misstep and kick the pins out from underneath this operation, it

will be catastrophic.

We also can’t forget what is going on in the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement between the north and the south, which has been

overshadowed and overlooked in this period. I would argue that the

south is in a period of governance-drift and increased interethnic

tensions and violence. It has ingested over $1 billion of oil earnings.

It’s not clear to what purposes these are being placed. This

is a nation-building exercise that the United States has embraced.

It’s a peace agreement that is unfolding that we bore central responsibility

for. We need to pay higher attention to this if—in order

to ensure that things go well.

Chairman Biden and Senator Lugar, I thank you for taking the lead in organizing

today’s hearing, and am grateful for the chance to contribute to this timely discussion

of the U.S. approach to the Darfur crisis.

I wish to concentrate my remarks upon a few select points.

*Our single most important and defensible goal should be a political settlement to*

*end Darfur’s internal war*

It is important to be very clear on this core goal of U.S. policy in Darfur. At times

that goal is not clearly stated or understood.

Realistically, our core aim must be to achieve through concerted international

means a political settlement that will replace Darfur’s violent internal war with an

interim cease-fire, and create a new form of governance in Darfur under fair and

just terms, backed by reliable and verifiable guarantees. There are no feasible alternatives.

We cannot ignore Sudan, nor are we in a position to change its government

or to directly enforce our will.

The goal of ending Darfur’s war is contained in the Annan plan agreed to by the

parties in Addis Ababa in November 2006. It makes an enduring peace settlement

the key to offering a credible hope that Darfur’s displaced and imperiled civilians

can return to a safer, more stable and self-sustaining life. It offers a framework for

coordinated international action.

Efforts to end impunity and bring to justice those the U.S. Government has accused

of perpetrating genocide should be carefully disentangled from the core goal

of ending Darfur’s war.

Ending impunity in the immediate term will be difficult to reconcile with winning

agreement to a negotiated peace settlement, including deployment of the African

Union/United Nations hybrid force which Khartoum will continue to fear will be an

instrument to arrest suspects in high-level positions of government. Ending impunity

in Sudan can and should be realized in the medium to long term through action

by the International Criminal Court. But more creativity is needed in the U.N. Security

Council to find the means to phase ICC action so that it is not in conflict

with efforts to end Darfur’s war.

*Diplomacy should be the centerpiece of the U.S. strategy*

Success will not come from acting alone in an urgent search for quick fixes. Nor

will it come through an overweening unilateral reliance on threatened punitive

measures which are untied to clear diplomatic goals and which may distance us

from our critical allies.

We should give primacy to diplomatic efforts to renew Darfur political negotiations,

based on revisions to the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. Such a negotiated

settlement is the only route to ending violence against civilians. Smart sanctions

and a strengthened African Union/United Nations operation are important

instruments of pressure and means to protect civilians, but by themselves, in the

absence of a political settlement, they will not stop the violence in Darfur. Progress

requires realism, a predominant reliance on diplomacy backed at critical moments

by focused, tough action, an accurate and timely assessment of facts on the ground,

and patience and stamina.

Sanctions can be effective, if enforced in a strategic and balanced fashion to move

the Government of Sudan and its violent proxies, the Janjaweed militias, and the

nonsignatory Darfur insurgents back to the negotiating table.

The nonsignatory spoilers continue to fragment, resist reentry into serious political

negotiations, derive lethal and logistical support from Chad, Eritrea, and likely

Libya, and carry out high levels of violence against civilians. Khartoum is able to

take full advantage of this confusion by playing rebel groups off of one another and

co-opting them individually.

In this next phase, we need a smarter strategy for unifying and focusing the

rebels on a realistic set of negotiating goals, at the same time that higher targeted

pressures are directed at Khartoum. That requires enhancing the incentives to the

scattered rebel groups to unite, and taking steps to reduce cross-border materiel

support.

*Sustained high-level U.S. leadership remains strategically important to achieving*

*any results in Sudan*

If we take our guidance from the negotiated conclusion to Sudan’s north-south

war, signed in January 2005, we can safely predict that progress will only be

achieved over a 3- to 5-year period, driven by a sustained international diplomatic

effort.

From 2001 through the end of 2004, Senator John Danforth, first as Special

Envoy to Sudan and later as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, made crucial

contributions to securing the peace between Sudan’s north and south. While serving

as Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick was similarly pivotal in moving the

parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Both these instances also generated a hard lesson: When there is a break in highlevel

engagement, a lack of continuity and follow-through, progress achieved can

soon begin to unravel. We’ve seen that most poignantly in the failure thus far to

implement the terms of the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.

In this present phase, there is fortunately renewed high-level U.S. engagement.

The current Special Envoy, Andrew Natsios, has been very active since the latter

part of 2006 in persuading the Chinese to begin to apply more pressure upon Khartoum,

and in reviving a strategy to renew Darfur peace negotiation, led by U.N.

Envoy Jan Eliasson and the African Union’s statesman Salim Salim. He has gained

access and credibility in Khartoum, among Darfur rebels, and in his dealings with

the U.N. Secretary General and his deputies, the Chinese, British, and other members

of the U.N. Security Council, and the African Union. No less important, Deputy

Secretary of State John Negroponte will visit Sudan this week and be in a better

position to help break the deadlock over political negotiations and the expansion

into Phase II of the African Union/United Nations peace operation.

*U.S. leadership should support a unified, robust international effort*

Actions by both Andrew Natsios and John Negroponte can be vital to moving

Khartoum and the Darfur rebels beyond recalcitrance. They can also be vital in

overcoming scattered and uncoordinated international efforts.

Regional states are vying with different initiatives to convince rebel leaders to

come behind a common agenda. The United Nations/African Union effort, spearheaded

by Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, offers the single best hope for a unified

effort to promote a renewed political process and move international efforts beyond

the present disarray. Every effort should be made by the United States, the U.N.

Security Council, and others to strengthen this initiative and eliminate competition.

Building a robust international effort requires better monitoring of on-the-ground

developments and a better shared estimate of current trend lines. At present there

is no reliable, independent metric on civilian fatalities and armed violence by the

Government of Sudan, its proxy militias, and the rising number of scattered insurgent

groups. The result is continued confusion and controversy over the actual levels

of violence, by which parties, and how accurately to characterize trend lines: e.g.

whether what is unfolding in Darfur constitutes genocide, ethnic cleansing, war

crimes, crimes against humanity, or random violence at the hands of brigands.

Downstream, this uncertainty complicates efforts to judge whether individual agencies

or movements are increasing or decreasing violence against civilians.

Atrocities are committed by all sides, but different parties are at different times

responsive to pressures to honor cease-fires. Claims are made frequently by advocacy

groups, many based in the United States, that genocide at the hands of the

GOS and the Janjaweed militia persists. At the same time, confidential sources

within the humanitarian community that is operational inside Darfur often claim

that fatalities are far below levels that would constitute genocide but above the

1,000 fatalities per annum level that signals an ongoing internal war. At present,

it is difficult to square these divergent estimates.

A unified international effort needs also to place Darfur in the context of a widening

set of interlocking conflicts in the Horn of Africa, encompassing Chad, the

Central African Republic, northern Uganda, and Somalia and Ethiopia. In important

ways, the Horn has crept back toward the dark era of the 1980s when there

were multiple tit-for-tat cross-border proxy wars that fed the Horn’s endemic instability.

One important implication for Darfur: There needs to be a higher priority attached

to building effective firewalls, potentially through small focused U.N. border

operations as well as through intensified diplomatic initiatives, that can separate

Darfur’s internal war from the surrounding region.

*The United States should continue to give priority to leveraging Chinese influence*

Notwithstanding China’s important economic ties with Sudan and public adherence

to the principle of noninterference, the last year has seen a subtle shift in China’s

approach to Sudan, a greater willingness to raise the issue of Darfur with

senior Sudanese leaders, and an emerging consensus with the United States that

implementation of the three-phase Annan plan is the best way forward to achieving

peace and stability in Darfur. This shift has been driven in part by China’s wish

to promote itself as an ethical global power, in part by discussions with other African

leaders invested in seeing the Darfur issue resolved, and in part by the threat

of increasing international pressures and tensions. While the United States and

China will continue to differ on respective assessments of the situation in Darfur

and on appropriate tactics in its resolution, the United States should seek to build

on China’s emerging openness to play a constructive role in ending the crisis in

Darfur.

International sanctions on Sudan could take different forms, and it is difficult to

predict with precision how different sanctions might impact Chinese behavior and

the ongoing dialog between the United States and China on Darfur.

If, for example, the United States were to begin soon to impose unilateral ‘‘smart’’

sanctions, under ‘‘plan B,’’ focused on select individuals and commercial entities, and

these measures did not directly or indirectly target Chinese economic interests, it

is conceivable that pressures upon Khartoum could be raised through sanctions

while action was taken to preserve the existing United States-Chinese consensus

and pursue more robust United States-Chinese collaborative pressures upon Khartoum.

If, on the other end of the spectrum, actions were taken that overtly vilify China,

directly target its economic stakes in Sudan, and threaten broader interests such

as the 2008 Olympics, that would risk undermining the present United States-

China dialog.

In between these two scenarios are intermediate options where sanctions might

be put in place that do directly impact Chinese economic interests in Sudan and

where the impact on Chinese behavior and the United States-China dialog might

be mixed.

Looking forward, we should continue to give high priority in our evolving dialog

with China in seeking greater Chinese commitments that support in concrete terms

the consensus on Darfur that has been forged between the United States and China.

The Chinese can and should press for deployment of special Chinese military units

to strengthen the African Union/United Nations force. China can and should use its

leadership and public voice in the U.N. Security Council to hold Khartoum to account.

China can and should further adjust its economic policies and instruments

to signal that it is systematically distancing itself from Khartoum and deliberately

lowering the priority of Sudan in its overall expansive engagement in Africa.

*Higher attention is needed to protect fragile humanitarian channels*

The United States has been the lead donor in creating on a crash basis an elaborate

humanitarian operation in Darfur that sustains the lives of over 2.5 million

and today relies on the courage and commitment of over 13,000 humanitarian workers.

Since 2003, the United States has invested $2.7 billion in humanitarian support

to Darfur. Programs now reach over 90 percent of those in need of assistance. This

achievement, and its continued fragility, are often lost in the heated debate over

Darfur.

High-value humanitarian commodities increasingly invite assault from the full

range of armed actors inside Darfur: Violent attacks upon humanitarian convoys

and workers, widespread theft of vehicles, and administrative harassment by the

GOS. This is a dangerous trend.

If humanitarian operations become significantly more insecure, they will be at

risk of a major sudden retrenchment which would have dire consequences for

Darfur’s vulnerable displaced population, the viability of the international humanitarian

infrastructure, and the Darfur region’s overall stability.

John Holmes, the new U.N. Under Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, recently

visited Sudan and negotiated with the GOS new terms for humanitarian access.

Sustained follow up will be needed to ensure compliance.

I mean, this is a question of whether you feel that

European opinion leaders or intellectuals are more—less——

I don’t think I’m really qualified to answer the

question——

With respect to——

Kosovo——

Mr. Chairman, may I make——

May I just make——

Dr. MORRISON . One comment?

I mean, the—what I’m trying to put a focus on

is the practical political problem of attempting to enlist support for

the kind of actions you’re talking about.

It’s—you mean with reference to other powers,

or——

I can—I share Larry’s general sense about this,

that much more can, and should, be done to lay the groundwork

for the embrace and advance and multilateralization of these. It’s

a little hard to get very precise, because so much of the preparations

have been done in quiet and out of—you know, out of sight.

And so, I haven’t been—I haven’t been privy to much of the prior

discussions. I think some of the hesitation in introduction has to

do with the lack of buy-in on the other side, in the sense that it—

you might find yourself alone, or too alone, or too visibly or conspicuously

alone. And so, there’s been a tendency, under those circumstances,

to be very cautious and to begin to break them into

incremental steps that perhaps would be more digestible.

If we’re talking about Sudan, specifically, I

think—you know, Susan’s point, earlier, that this is—this is not a

major economic or military or political power we’re talking about.

The implications for trade are—and investment exposure—are relatively

modest. Like all of these—like ourselves and every European

government, they’re going to look at this in terms of the implications

downstream in other settings.

And——

Well, I think that the—the fact that the—these

kinds of sanctions have been used to reasonable effect on North

Korea, and are being implemented in Iran, gives a credibility

and——

And——

And——

Yes; but what I’m getting at is that it’s proven

that these can be—these can have some impact on the target—the

target of the sanctions, without having huge costs that are——

That are sideline costs. That’s what

I’m——